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Introduction 
 
Among the number of institutional reforms introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, one of the most important is the strengthening of the role of national 
parliaments in the European Union. For this very reason the Treaty is referred to as 
the "Treaty of European Parliaments".1 Some experts argue that a new institution 
has been formed in the European Union – the national parliaments acting jointly.2 
The significance of these changes is great, yet the real role of parliaments will 
depend on their readiness to fulfil their new obligations and their ability to exercise 
their new powers. That, in turn, will depend on whether some essential 
adjustments are made on the legislative, procedural and logistic levels.  
The purpose of this study is to look closer at the process of the adaptation of 
the Polish parliament – the Sejm and the Senate – to the Lisbon Treaty reforms. 
These transformations are quite deep. A new law has been prepared, the so–called 
Act on Cooperation, which governs the principles of the cooperation between the 
government and the two chambers of the Polish parliament in matters related to 
EU membership. Even though the adaptation has not yet been completed (an 
initiative of President Bronis?aw Komorowski has also appeared, proposing to 
amend the Constitution of the Republic of Poland), it is worth examining the 
changes that have been made within the twelve months under the rule of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009.  
The paper begins with a short outline of the most important principles of the 
involvement of both chambers of the parliament in EU policy-making in Poland. 
The Polish adjustments have been systematised and divided into statutory, 
regulation and constitutional ones. Furthermore, while listing the individual 
changes introduced by the Treaty, the role of national parliaments has been 
discussed together with the Polish response to these changes.3 
1 Conference at the Senate of the Republic of Poland ”Treaty of Lisbon – Treaty of European Parliaments”, 
Warsaw 22–23 February 2010  
2 Davor Jan?i?, A New Organ of the European Union: “National Parliaments Jointly”, ”Federal Trust Policy 
Commentary”, The Federal Trust for Education and Research, February 2008 – 
http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/Parliaments_Jointly.pdf [access: 10 January 2011]. 
3 This publication has been prepared as part of the project implemented in cooperation with the Institute for 
European Policy EUROPEUM in Prague and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs – 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, with the support of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. The 
results of the project also include two similar analyses referring to the German, Czech and Slovak 
parliaments: Peter Becker, Daniela Kietz, The German Parliament in the Lisbon EU: Guarding 
subsidiarity, defending sovereignty?, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin 2011; 
David Král, Vladimír Bartovic, The Czech and the Slovak parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty, Institute for 
European Policy EUROPEUM, Prague 2010. 
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The role of the Sejm and the Senate in EU policy-making in 
Poland 
The tasks and the powers of the Polish parliament in matters related to EU 
membership are currently governed mainly by the Act on Cooperation4 and by the 
Rules of Procedure of both chambers.5 As this analysis will further show, it is the 
amendments to these particular documents that constitute the most important 
elements of adapting the Sejm and Senate to the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty. 
As in other Member States, the participation of the Sejm and the Senate in 
Polish EU–related political activities relies on the strong committees dealing with 
EU matters: the Sejm Committee for European Union Affairs and the Senate's 
European Union Affairs Committee. The two committees have wider prerogatives 
than other parliamentary committees. They can interact directly with the 
government and their opinions are expressed on behalf of the entire chamber (the 
Sejm or the Senate, respectively). It is for this reason that the Sejm Committee for 
European Union Affairs is sometimes called the "little Sejm".6 The Committee 
enjoys high prestige and MPs are eager to seek membership on it. However, it can 
be composed of not more than forty-six MPs7 and its composition must reflect, 
proportionally, the size of all parliamentary clubs and groups. 
The Committees have the right to give opinions on drafts of EU legislation, 
on the government's position concerning such drafts and the stance that the 
government is planning to take on the legislation at the Council of the European 
Union. The opinions are not binding and the "weight" of the opinions issued by the 
Sejm and the Senate varies. The opinion in theory should form the basis for the 
government’s position. But in practice, that only means that if the government fails 
to take the opinion into consideration, it is obliged to explain, without delay, the 
reasons for such divergence. Thus, failure to consider the opinion of the Committee 
does have some legal consequences, though  it does not affect the validity of the 
stance taken by the representative of Poland in the Council. Nevertheless, the 
Committee has full control over the extent to which its opinions are taken into 
consideration during the legislative process. 
The Senate Committee does not have a similar control tool at its disposal. 
4 Currently it is the Act dated 11 March 2004 on cooperation between the Council of Ministers and the Sejm 
and the Senate in matters concerning the membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union 
(Journal of Laws of 2004 No. 52, item 515; Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 160, item 1342), but on 13 
February 2011 a new act will enter into force, the Act of 8 October 2010 on the cooperation of the Council 
of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate in matters concerning the membership of the Republic of 
Poland in the European Union (Journal of Laws of 2010, No. 213 item 1395). 
5 The Rules of procedure of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland – schedule to the announcement of the Speaker 
of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland dated 21 January 2009. (M.P. [Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Poland] of 2009, No. 5, item 47 as amended.); The Rules of Procedure of the Senate of the Republic of 
Poland – Schedule to the announcement of the Speaker of the Senate of the Republic of Poland dated 13 
May 2010 (M.P.[Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland] of 2010, No. 39, item 542). 
6 Ziemowit Cie?lik, Udzia? Sejmu w stanowieniu prawa Unii Europejskiej [Participation of the Sejm in the 
making of the European Union’s law], [in:] Rola Sejmu i Senatu w Unii Europejskiej. Seminarium dla 
nowo wybranych pos?ów VI kadencji [The role of the Sejm and the Senate in the European Union. Seminar 
for the newly elected deputies of the 6th Term of Office], Kancelaria Sejmu, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 
Warsaw 2007, p. 38. 
7 Their number is normally close to this limit. 
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The failure to consider the opinion of the Senate Committee does not lead to any 
consequences. This, in turn, is a result of the fact that the Senate does not have any 
controlling powers over the government. Therefore the role of the Sejm Committee 
in this process is much more significant. 
The Sejm Committee for European Union Affairs has adopted a number of 
organisational solutions whose aim is to facilitate the process of setting priorities in 
the situation when the EU legislative agenda contains a large number of issues. 
The system has been devised of appointing two deputies – co–rapporteurs (one 
from the ruling party and one from the opposition party) who prepare positions of 
the Committee on a given draft and on the government position. If none of them 
submits objections to the draft, the Committee takes the decisions without 
considering the matter, provided that no other member of the Committee objects. 
All such drafts are considered by the Committee collectively (the so–called A list) 
and without debate.8 
 
Polish adjustments to the Lisbon Treaty 
 
The process of adjustment of the Polish parliament to the changes 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty may be divided into three stages: legal changes, 
procedural changes and constitutional changes. The necessity of implementing the 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty led to a decision to carry out a comprehensive 
modernisation of the Polish system of cooperation between the executive and the 
legislative branches on European matters, using the experience of Poland’s six 
years of membership in the European Union. Hence the decision to amend the 2004 
Act on Cooperation, governing the principles of the government's cooperation 
with the Sejm and the Senate on European affairs. Only at a later date will changes 
to the Sejm Rules of Procedure be made, in order to set in detail the principles of 
exercising the new powers. Whereas in the Senate, the changes to the Rules of 
Procedure were made even before the Act on Cooperation entered into force. The 
adjustment process may be concluded with the planned amendment to the 
Constitution. Work on the amendment of the Constitution is in progress. For this 
reason this publication presents the situation one year after the Lisbon Treaty’s 
entry into force, paying particular attention to the key legal changes. 
 
Figure 1. Outline of the Polish parliament adjustment process 
 
 
The diagram in Fig. No. 1 shows an outline of the adjustment process, 
although it should only be treated as approximation. As already mentioned, 
changes to the Sejm Rules of Procedure had been introduced before the work on 
8 Ziemowit Cie?lik, Udzia? Sejmu w stanowieniu prawa Unii Europejskiej, op. cit., p. 42. 
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the Act on Cooperation was completed. In addition, the amendment of the 
Constitution would probably not conclude the adjustment process as it would 
entail the need for another amendment to the Act on Cooperation. 
 
The new Act on Cooperation 
 
Officials from the Chancellery of the Sejm admit that the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty has made it necessary not only to make some legal and 
procedural changes in order to adjust the operation of both chambers to the new 
rules, but has also provided a stimulus for reform, re–organisation and 
modernisation of the Polish model of participation in EU policy-making. After six 
years of EU membership, it was possible to evaluate the cooperation so far, to find 
its strengths and weaknesses. 
The Act will come into effect on 13 February 2011.  
The Act is based on the 2004 act and copies a lot of its provisions. It defines 
the obligations of the government to the Sejm and the Senate and their bodies: the 
obligation to cooperate (Art. 2), the obligation to provide information on EU 
documents (for example, consultation documents, work plans, drafts of 
international agreements to which the European Union is planning to become a 
party), the obligation to communicate the government position on drafts of EU 
legislation. The Sejm, the Senate or their bodies (competent under the respective 
Rules of Procedure) can require the government to provide information on any 
other matter related to membership in the European Union (Art. of 3 sec. 2).  
Certain changes have been made to the mechanism of reviewing the draft 
positions of the Council of Ministers. The government still has fourteen days for 
sending the draft position, which – as before – must include an assessment of the 
legal, social, economic and financial impact of a regulation, as well as information 
about the legislative procedure and the mode of voting in the Council. A novelty in 
the Act is the introduction of an obligation to attach information concerning the 
compliance of the draft regulation with the principle of subsidiarity (Art. of 7 sec. 3 
pt 3), a matter which will be discussed later. The bill extends the time for providing 
opinions on draft government positions from twenty-one to forty-nine days. 
In the new Act, the obligation to seek the opinion of the Sejm and the Senate 
before considering a piece of EU legislation at the Council was retained. In 
addition, in case of failure to seek the opinion of the parliament or failure to 
consider it, the government is obliged to explain its reasons (Art. 10–15). Another 
novelty, arising directly from new regulations of the Lisbon Treaty, is a provision 
concerning filing complaints to the Court of Justice by the Sejm and the Senate 
(Art. 17). As a matter of fact, this has raised some controversy in the relations 
between the government and the parliament as will be discussed later. 
The provision concerning the cooperation at exercising European Union law 
is a copy of the provision from the previous Act (Art. 18). What is new is Sec. 4, 
introduced by the Senate, imposing on the government the obligation to notify the 
Sejm and the Senate of legislative works related to the implementation of European 
Union legislation whose date of implementation has expired or will expire shortly. 
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This provision can contribute to the improvement of Polish performance 
(traditionally one of the worst in the European Union) in the implementation of EU 
directives. 
Some technical changes have also been introduced concerning the issuing of 
opinions by the Sejm on candidates for positions in EU institutions (changes to the 
names of EU courts – Art. 19). Articles 21 and 22 are also new. They apply to 
cooperation during the Polish Presidency of the Council, imposing an obligation 
provide information about the course of the Presidency and at the same time 
introducing certain exemptions from the obligation to seek the opinion of the 
parliament when considering the legislative acts at the Council during the 
Presidency. 
In the fifth chapter of the Act on Cooperation, an amendment to the 2000 
Act on International Agreements9 has been introduced. Article 23 introduces, 
among other things, the procedure for the withdrawal of Poland from the 
European Union and the procedure of ratification of treaty revisions by the so-
called passerelle procedure. The most important statutory changes arising from the 
Lisbon Treaty will be discussed further down in the paper. 
The government took an active part in the work on the Act. It was on the 
government’s initiative that the above-mentioned exemptions from the 
requirement to keep the parliament informed during the course of the Presidency 
have been introduced. Controversy in the relations between the parliament and the 
Council of Ministers appeared mainly in connection with the filing of complaints 
to the Court of Justice, deadlines applying to the government and the application 
of the passerelle procedure. 
 
Changes to the Rules of Procedure of both chambers 
 
Another stage of the adjustment process of the Sejm – it was the first for the 
Senate – included changes in the Rules of Procedure of both chambers. In the 
explanatory statement to the draft, it had been written that "because of constraints 
resulting from the principle of autonomy of both chambers (Art. 112 of the 
Constitution), some of the provisions implementing the provisions of the Treaty 
should be embedded in the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm and of the Senate rather 
than in the Act itself”.10 Internal work rules related to issues such as the procedure 
for examining the compliance with the subsidiarity principle, the procedure for 
applying to the Court of Justice or the procedure of veto against the passerelle 
procedure, require regulation within the Rules of Procedure. 
At the request of the Sejm Bureau of Research [Biuro Analiz Sejmowych], 
instead of the two–week vacatio legis originally put in the draft Act on Cooperation, 
a three–month time for its implementation has been introduced (Art. 25). This time 
9 Act dated 14 April 2000 on international agreements (Journal of Laws of 2000, No. 39, item 443; Journal 
of Laws of 2002, No. 216, item 1824). 
10 Draft law on the cooperation of the Council of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate on matters related to 
the membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union z with the explanatory notes, Sejm print 
no. 3000, p. 1 (explanatory notes). 
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has been designed for both chancelleries to launch all the procedures provided for 
by the new Act, to prepare the changes in the Rules of Procedure and to bring them 
into effect. Problems such as the division of responsibilities between European 
affairs committees and sector committees or the idea of a joint Sejm and Senate 
committee for European Affairs will require decisions at the political level.  
At the Senate, the changes to the Rules of Procedure were introduced even 
before the completion of the work on the new Act. Two provisions concerning the 
subsidiarity procedure examination were included in the Rules. If the Committee 
decides that an EU legislative proposal does not comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity, it submits a draft resolution to the Speaker of the Senate, who sends 
the proposal to the competent committees, including the Committee for European 
Union Affairs (Art. 75d of the Senate Rules of Procedure11). The procedure applied 
in case of filing a complaint to the Court of Justice is similar. The Committee 
submits it to the Speaker, who then sends the draft to the appropriate committees, 
including the Committee for European Union Affairs (Art. 75e). In the case of the 
passerelle procedure, the Speaker sends the matter to the competent committees, 
including the Committee for European Union Affairs, which then present a joint 
report. The Senate adopts a resolution expressing its opposition to the decision of 
the European Council with the absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least 
half of the senators (Art. 75 f–g). Further changes may be introduced into the Rules 
of Procedure after the work on the Act is completed.  
 
Amendment of the Constitution? 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland doesn't contain provisions which 
would directly regulate the role of the legislative branch in EU policy-making in 
Poland, including the adoption of EU law, or other regulations directly concerning 
the competence of authorities in relation to the Polish membership in the European 
Union. Changing the Constitution by adding a new chapter devoted to Polish 
membership in the European Union was discussed even before the accession in 
2004. A debate on this subject was initiated by the publications of the Institute of 
Public Affairs.12 An amendment of the Constitution would make it possible to 
properly structure the division of competencies and to protect EU policy-making 
against conflicts of competence. As the Constitutional Tribunal noted in its ruling 
of 2005, "The Polish Constitution does not contain provisions directly regulating 
the role of the Sejm and the Senate in the European Union law-making process (the 
constitutional legislator should consider the advisability of having this matter 
regulated) ".13 
11 The Senate Rules of Procedure, op. cit.
12 See, Jan Barcz, Ustrojowe aspekty cz?onkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej [The political system aspects 
of Polish membership in the European Union], Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2003. See also: Jerzy 
Jaskiernia, Cz?onkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej a problem nowelizacji Konstytucji RP {Polish 
membership in the European Union and the problem of amending the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland], Wydawnictwo Naukowe ”Scholar”, Warsaw 2004. 
13 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal dated 12 January 2005 (K 24/04) ”Inequality in competences of 
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The issue of having the division of competencies in EU policymaking 
regulated in the Constitution was particularly visible at the time of the conflict of 
competencies between Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Lech Kaczy?ski 
about who should represent Poland during European Council summit meetings. 
However, the solution was reached not by amending the Constitution, but through 
the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal.14 The situation was similar in 2005, 
when the Constitutional Tribunal ruled on the competence of the Senate to 
pronounce its opinion on the position of the government concerning EU legislative 
proposals. The Tribunal decided then that giving an opinion on the position of the 
government did not constitute performing of a control function over the 
government, which is reserved exclusively for the Sejm, but a legislative function. 
Therefore both chambers should have equal rights in this respect.  
The necessity to amend the Constitution was also mentioned in the 
explanatory notes to the draft of the new Act on Cooperation: “Whereas the new 
powers of the Sejm and the Senate are not found in the Polish ground–law, it 
should be acknowledged that the proper implementation of the Treaty provisions, 
in principle, requires that appropriate changes be made to the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland”. 
In mid November 2010, in his first legislative initiative, President Bronis?aw 
Komorowski proposed an amendment to the Constitution, including an addition 
of a chapter devoted to the membership of Poland in the European Union.15 The 
proposal prepares the Constitution for the adoption the euro, adapts the law to 
certain provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and puts in order the division of 
competencies in EU policy-making. Such changes would not conclude the process 
of adjustment to the Treaty, since after their implementation it would probably still 
be necessary to amend the Act on Cooperation. It would, however conclude the 
work on the most significant issues. Its success will depend on political agreement 
which may be difficult to reach in a year of parliamentary elections. The special 
committee of the Sejm for the amendment of the Constitution16 began work on 24 
November 2010. 
 
                      
Sejm and Senate committees in respect of European Union legislative proposals”, p. 11. 
14 In the view of the Constitutional Tribunal, “the precise division of competence between the central 
constitutional bodies of the state must be made, primarily, by interpretation of the assumptions 
underpinning the construction of the political system as shaped by the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland, referring, in particular, to its origins (including the evolution of the competencies of individual 
organs of the executive power) and to the fundamental principles of the Constitution” – see the judgment 
of the Constitutional Tribunal of 20 May 2009 (Kpt 2/08) ”Conflict of competence concerning the 
indication of the central constitutional organ of the state which is authorised to represent the Republic of 
Poland at the meetings of the European Council”. 
15 The proposal is available at the website of the Polish President’s Chancellery – 
http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/art,1523,prezydent–zglaszam–pierwsza–inicjatywe–
ustawodawcza.html [access: 18 November 2010]. 
16 Special Committee for considering the draft proposals of acts amending the Constitution of the Republic 
of Poland and draft proposals of acts related to those amendments. The Committee is considering the 
President’s proposal together with three proposals submitted by MPs. 
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Adjustment of the Sejm and the Senate to the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions 
Assessment of reforms 
 
Experts disagree about the significance and effectiveness of the changes 
regarding the powers of national parliaments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty into 
the institutional system of the European Union. For example, an expert of the 
British parliament believes that with regard to examining the compliance of EU 
legislation with the subsidiarity principle, the Treaty, in fact, does not bring 
anything new – it had been one of the elements of examination carried out in the 
British parliament even before the Treaty. An opinion has even appeared that the 
parliament will not let the subsidiarity issue divert its attention from the material 
content of the proposals.17 
In the Polish parliament the changes have been received in a more positive 
way. That is at least the assessment of Sejm Chancellery officials. A view prevails 
that the Treaty indeed enhances the role of national parliaments in the European 
Union, albeit less so on account of particular powers than as a result of the 
increased self–awareness of parliaments concerning their role. Subsidiarity is 
nothing new for the Polish Sejm, either, because it could address this issue earlier, 
although not directly to the European Commission. The officials also admit that it 
is the government and not the parliament which is the main legislator with regard 
to EU law. Parliaments have lost their direct influence over the making of EU law 
and they do not get it back, not in the least, through the Treaty of Lisbon. Their 
influence on EU decision-making processes depends not on the Treaty provisions 
but on domestic regulations, on the role of the parliament in the system of 
coordination of EU policy-making.  
The most important reforms of the Lisbon Treaty are listed below, with 
indications of Poland’s future response to these changes. 
 
Direct communication with the European Commission 
 
The main innovation of the Lisbon Treaty directed at national parliaments is 
the obligation imposed on the European Commission to send them all documents 
connected with the European Union legislative process. Previously all documents 
were handed over to parliaments by the government. This change is mainly of a 
technical nature, but it also means that deputies and senators will be able to get 
acquainted with documents of the European Commission and to start working on 
them at an earlier stage. 
At this point it is worth recalling the experience so far of the Polish 
17 Andrew Makower, ?ycie po Lizbonie – dostosowanie rozwi?za? administracyjnych [Life after Lisbon – 
adjustment of administrative solutions], materials from a conference at the Senate of the Republic of 
Poland “Treaty of Lisbon – Treaty of European Parliaments”, Warsaw, 22–23 February 2010. 
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parliament in direct communication with the European Commission. It was 
envisaged by the so-called "Barosso Initiative" of 2006, under which – in spite of 
the lack of a treaty obligation – the European Commission would send EU 
legislative proposals to national parliaments, expecting them to give their opinion. 
Although such opinions were in no way binding, they let the European 
Commission know the position of parliaments and, if necessary, make corrections 
to the proposals. 
The Sejm and the Senate used that instrument only to a very little extent. 
None of the chambers of the Polish parliament found its way to the group of the 
most active ones, such as the senates of France and the Czech Republic, the 
German Bundesrat, the British House of Lords or the parliaments of Sweden, 
Denmark and Portugal which altogether submitted almost three fourths of the 718 
opinions the European Commission received in the years 2006–2009. During that 
period, the Polish Senate issued only one opinion, and the Sejm – six opinions 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Number of responses by the Sejm and the Senate to the proposals sent 
under the so-called “Barroso Initiative” 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Sejm 1 0 5 0 
Senate 1 0 0 0 
Source: European Commission, Annual Report 2008 on relations between the European 
Commission and the National Parliaments, COM(2009) 343, 7 July 2010; European 
Commission, Annual Report 2009 on relations between the European Commission and 
the National Parliaments, COM(2010) 291, 2 June 2010. 
 
 
Examining the compliance of legislative proposals with the 
subsidiarity principle 
 
The most important and the most widely discussed innovation of the Lisbon 
Treaty regarding the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process of 
the European Union, is granting them the role of "the guardians of subsidiarity". 
This power has been described in the two above-mentioned Protocols attached to 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
Parliaments can assess the compliance with the subsidiarity principle ex ante 
and ex post. For the ex ante evaluation, the so–called "yellow card" and "orange 
card" procedures have been introduced (also called an "early warning" 
mechanism). Any chamber of a national parliament which decides that a draft EU 
legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, may issue a so-
called reasoned opinion within eight weeks from the date of transmission of the 
draft (Art. 6 of Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality). If such a view is expressed by one third of parliamentary 
chambers (one quarter when the legislative act regards the area of freedom, 
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security and justice), the draft must be reviewed. After such review, the proposal 
may be maintained, withdrawn or amended, with reasons given for the decision 
("yellow card" procedure). If an ordinary majority of chambers give their opinion 
against the draft (only within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure), 
and the European Commission decides to maintain the proposal, it is obliged to 
justify why it believes the proposal to be compliant with the principle of 
subsidiarity. Opinions of parliaments and the opinion of the European 
Commission will be attached to the draft and will be taken into account in the 
decision-making process. The European Parliament and the Council will then 
assess the compliance of the act with the subsidiarity principle before the first 
reading and with the ordinary majority (in case of the European Parliament) or 
with a 55% majority of votes (in case of the Council) can decide about its non-
compliance with this principle ("orange card"). This means the end of the 
legislative process. The "orange card" procedure applies, however, only to the 
legislative acts adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure (it does not apply 
to the acts adopted under the special legislative procedure), which does constitute 
a certain restriction on the application of the new powers of parliaments. 
 
The subsidiarity principle 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level. (Art. 5. of the Treaty on European Union). 
 
The ex post evaluation consists in granting parliaments the right to refer an 
act to the Court of Justice in case of non-compliance with the subsidiarity principle, 
following the internal procedure of a given parliament or a given chamber or 
through the agency of the executive branch. This evaluation method will be more 
widely discussed further down in the paper. 
What is important, in the case of bicameral parliaments, each chamber acts 
autonomously in the above-mentioned competence framework, both issuing 
reasoned opinions, as well as submitting their complaint to the Court of Justice. 
This represents significant enhancement of the status of the upper chambers, 
including the Polish Senate, in the area of EU matters. 
The Sejm and the Senate have participated in subsidiarity checks carried out 
by the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees (Conférence 
des Organes Specialisés dans les Affaires Communautaires, COSAC).18 According 
to officials, the checks have been successful and no serious problems have been 
encountered. 
In the period between January and December 2010, national parliaments of 
the Member States issued, in total thirty three reasoned opinions, out of which two 
were prepared by the Sejm, and four by the Senate.19 Reasoned opinions on two 
drafts of EU legislative acts were submitted by both chambers of the Polish 
18 Forum of cooperation of parliaments in the European Union – http://www.cosac.eu. 
19 As at 8 December 2010 – http://www.ipex.eu. 
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parliament. One of the Senate's opinions regarded the seasonal workers directive. 
It was the act on which the greatest number of reasoned opinions were issued –– 
seven –– but still too few to launch the "yellow card" mechanism. 
The officials working at the Polish parliament are rather sceptical about the 
possibility of applying the "yellow" and the "orange card" procedures. Such view is 
probably common all over Europe. An opinion prevails that it will be easier to 
convince their own government and win a majority in the Council than to obtain 
reasoned opinions from one third of parliamentary chambers in the European 
Union. This instrument can serve the purpose of exerting pressure on the 
European Commission rather than being put to official use.  
The internal procedures concerning the subsidiarity principle must be 
regulated in the Rules of Procedure of the Sejm and the Senate. What is important, 
under the new Act on Cooperation, the Council of Ministers will be obliged to 
include information about the compliance of an EU legislative proposal with 
principle of subsidiarity in the so-called government positions sent to the 
parliament. Thus in practice, it will be the responsibility of the government to 
check compliance with the subsidiarity principle, and the two chambers will have 
to decide to what extent they agree with this assessment. 
 
Referral to the Court of Justice 
 
The procedure of examining the compliance of EU legislative acts with the 
subsidiarity principle ex post raised some controversy in the relations between the 
parliament and the government during the work on the Act on Cooperation. A 
problem that required solution was whether the Sejm or the Senate should submit 
their complaints independently or through the government. The Council of 
Ministers proposed that the government should be an intermediary in submitting a 
complaint only when it shared the objections of the Sejm or the Senate – otherwise 
the chamber should file the complaint independently. That would make it possible 
to avoid a conflict situation when the government would have to submit a 
complaint with which it disagrees.20 
Experts of the Sejm Bureau of Research argued that even though the 
solution proposed by the government seemed more effective and logically 
justified, it could, however, be regarded as unconstitutional.21 Irrespective of the 
power granted to parliaments in the Treaty of Lisbon, parliament chambers cannot 
present their position directly on the forum of international organisations, 
therefore adoption of such a solution would require a prior amendment to the 
Constitution. Eventually the Act provides for an obligation to file a complaint to 
the Court of Justice by the Prime Minister on the basis of a resolution of the Sejm or 
of the Senate (Art. 16). The chambers authorise the Prime Minister to represent 
20 During a meeting of the Sejm Committee for European Affairs such a solution was compared to a situation 
when a person who does not want the divorce, is forced to draft the petition – see ”Biuletyn z posiedzenia 
Komisji do spraw Unii Europejskiej” [Newsletter of the meeting of the European Affairs Committee], no. 
175 (3655/VI term of office, 9 April 2010, pp. 16–17. 
21 Ibidem, pp. 17–18. 
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them in matters related to their complaint (Art. 16 sec. 2) and only they (the 
chamber filing the complaint, respectively) can decide to withdraw it (Art. 16 sec. 
4). 
 
Passerelle procedures 
 
The Lisbon Treaty grants national parliaments the power of veto against 
some of the passerelle procedures. These procedures can be divided into two 
groups: structural ones, defined in the Treaty on European Union as "simplified 
revision procedures" (Art. of 48 sec. 6–7 of the consolidated version of the Treaty22), 
and the ad hoc passerelle procedures provided for in other articles of the Treaty. 
The simplified revision procedure according to Art. 48 applies to: 
• revision of the Third Part of the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union – “Internal policies and action of the Union” (Art. 48 sec. 6),23 
• going from the unanimity vote to qualified majority vote in the Council in a 
given area of EU activity (Art. 48 sec. 7), 
• going from the special legislative procedure to ordinary legislative procedure in  
a given area of EU activity (Art. 48 sec. 7). 
All the above-mentioned decisions shall be made unanimously by the 
European Council. In the first case "the decision shall not enter into force until it is 
approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements" (Art. 48 sec. 6). Thus no special role has been envisaged here for 
national parliaments, but the Sejm and the Senate have been included in the Polish 
procedure for approval of such a decision. According to Art. 23 of the new Act on 
Cooperation, amending the Act on international agreements, any act adopted in 
this mode shall require ratification with the consent granted in the form of a statute 
by force of Art. 89 sec. of 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.  
A role for parliaments has been envisaged in the provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty in two remaining cases, where the requirement for the approval of the 
decision by the Member States has been replaced with the power of veto against 
such decisions granted to parliaments. An objection of any parliament lodged 
within six months means that the decision is not adopted. 
In this particular case, the Act on Cooperation does not provide for 
ratification as such. However, a similar solution has been used. According to Art. 
14 of this act,  
a decision on the Polish position is made by the President at the request of the 
government with the consent given in a statute. The Act on Cooperation 
determines, whether the representative of Poland will be in favour of adopting a 
22 Official Journal of the EU, 2010/C 83/01, 30 March 2010. 
23 This concerns the activity of the European Union in the following areas: internal market, free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital, agriculture and fisheries, area of freedom, security and justice, 
competition, taxation and approximation of laws, economic and monetary policy, employment, social 
policy, European Social Fund, education, youth and sport, culture, public health, consumer protection, 
Trans–European networks, industry, cohesion policy, research and development, environmental protection, 
energy, tourism, civil protection, administrative cooperation (Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union, Part Three, Titles I–XXIV, Official Journal of the EU 2010/C 83/01, 30 March 2010). 
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legislative proposal or whether he will abstain from voting. If the President 
refrains from making a decision, the representative of Poland shall vote for 
rejecting the proposal. The procedure does differ, but as a matter of fact, the role of 
the Sejm and the Senate is similar – under this procedure, the parliament may 
block the decision by failing to pass the relevant statute. 
The same procedure has been applied to other passerelle procedures 
defined in the Treaty, applicable to specific areas of EU activity. Article 14 of the 
Act on Cooperation deals with procedures in which the European Council decides 
unanimously,24 whereas Art. 15 of the same act applies to the procedures where 
the Council (of the European Union) decides.25 Since each of these procedures 
actually leads to the amendment of the treaty without carrying out the ratification 
process, the decision has been made that the national procedure of deciding about 
the Polish position on those issues should include the parties that would have been 
involved if ratification had been required. Thus the Sejm and the Senate will be 
able to block every such decision.  
In the course of work on the Act on Cooperation, the passerelle procedures 
caused a lot of controversy – of both legal and political nature. Doubts were raised 
by the very fact of involving the parliament and the President in deciding about 
the position of Poland within the decision-making process in the Council or in the 
European Council, as foreign policy is the responsibility of the government. One of 
the experts regarded the solution described above, including the statutory consent, 
to be an infringement upon the constitutional powers of the Council of Ministers to 
decide about the position to be presented at the meetings of the European Council 
as well as a violation of the division and balance of powers26 (two experts held an 
opposite view27). 
The critical opinions in that matter were shared by the Senate, which 
24 The provisions in question: Art. 31 sec. 3 of the Treaty on European Union – extension of the right of the 
Council to act by qualified majority in the area of foreign policy, Art. 312 sec. 2. of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union – authorising the Council to act by qualified majority when adopting 
the so-called multiannual financial framework and the acts referred to in the Protocol No. 9 (on the 
decision of the Council relating to the implementation of Art. 16 sec. 4 of the Treaty on European Union 
and Art. 238 sec. 2 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union between 1 November 2014 and 
31 March 2017 and as from 1st April 2017). 
25 The provision in question is Art. 81 sec. 3 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union – going 
from the special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure in case of certain aspects of 
family law, Art. 153 sec. 2 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union – applying the ordinary 
legislative procedure to certain aspects of labour law, Art. 192 sect. 2 of the Treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union – applying the ordinary legislative procedure to certain aspects of environmental 
protection law, Art. 333 sect. 1–2 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union – applying the 
qualified majority vote in the Council or the ordinary legislative procedure to decisions on enhanced 
cooperation. 
26 Piotr Czarny, Opinia prawna na temat wybranych rozwi?za? projektu ustawy o wspó?pracy Rady Ministrów 
z Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach zwi?zanych z cz?onkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii 
Europejskiej [Legal opinion on selected provisions of the proposed act on the cooperation of the Council 
of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate on matters related to the membership of the Republic of Poland 
in the European Union (in reference to print no. 3000), 4 June 2010. 
27 Andrzej Szmyt, Opinia prawna na temat wybranych rozwi?za? projektu ustawy o wspó?pracy Rady 
Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach zwi?zanych z cz?onkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii 
Europejskiej [Legal opinion on selected provisions of the proposed act on the cooperation of the Council 
of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate on matters related to the membership of the Republic of Poland 
in the European Union (in reference to print no. 3000), 4 June 2010.
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proposed an amendment according to which the opinion of the Sejm and the 
Senate concerning the decision of the European Council in the above-mentioned 
issues would not be binding for the government. The Council of Ministers would 
seek the opinion of the Sejm and the Senate, and if it failed to take it into account, it 
would explain the reasons for the divergence.28 Thus the Senate abandoned the 
concept of the necessary requirement for a statutory consent. Quoting the opinions 
of constitutional law specialists (Bogus?aw Banaszak and Ryszard Piotrowski), the 
Senate argued that raising the act concerning a specific position of the government 
on a decision of the European Council to the rank of a statute was inadmissible, 
since such an act would not be of general character, and only such regulations – 
according to the legal doctrine and the body of the Constitutional Tribunal's 
judicial decisions – can constitute a statute.29 Ryszard Piotrowski shared the doubts 
expressed by of one of the Sejm experts, and stated that the proposed model for 
deciding on the government position violated the constitutional division of 
powers. Making the action of the Council of Ministers in European matters 
dependent on passing a statute constitutes an excessive interference of the 
legislative branch in the competence of the government. The role of the President is 
still another problem – the proposed act confers on him powers related to EU 
policy-making which do not have grounds in the Constitution.30 
The government, on the other hand, voiced some practical concerns as to 
the application of statutory consent to decisions made under Art. 48 sec. 7 of Treaty 
on the European Union, towards which national parliaments have the right of veto 
anyway under the simplified treaty revision procedure. It was argued that there 
was no need to guarantee that the Sejm and the Senate could influence the position 
of the government in this respect, as it had already been guaranteed by the right of 
veto at the EU level.31 
From a political point of view, it was the role of the President in the process 
that sparked the greatest disputes. According to the adopted act, whereby the 
decision on the position of Poland in the European Council within the scope of the 
above-mentioned articles shall require a consent granted in a statute, the final 
decision shall belong to the President. Whereas the solution proposed by the 
28 See, the resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland dated 12 August 2010 r. on the act on 
cooperation of the Council of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland on matters 
related to the membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union, Sejm print no. 3339. 
29 With the exceptions set forth in the Constitution (for instance, a budget act, a ratification act) – see 
Bogus?aw Banaszak, Opinia prawna na temat zgodno?ci z Konstytucj? RP wybranych regulacji zawartych 
w projekcie ustawy o wspó?pracy Rady Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach zwi?zanych z 
cz?onkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej [Legal opinion on selected provisions of the 
proposed act on the cooperation of the Council of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate on matters 
related to the membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union, OE–141, Senate of the 
Republic of Poland. 
30 Ryszard Piotrowski, Opinia prawna na temat zgodno?ci z Konstytucj? RP wybranych regulacji zawartych 
w projekcie ustawy o wspó?pracy Rady Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach zwi?zanych z 
cz?onkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej [Legal opinion on selected provisions of the 
proposed act on the cooperation of the Council of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate on matters 
related to the membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union, print no. 754, Senate of the 
Republic of Poland. 
31 See, the statement made by minister Maciej Szpunar during a meeting of the Sejm Committee for European 
Union Affairs – ”Biuletyn z posiedzenia Komisji do spraw Unii Europejskiej” [Newsletter of the meeting 
of the European Affairs Committee], no. 175 (3655/VI term of office, 9 April 2010), p. 10. 
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government and the Senate, which does not require passing of a statute, would 
mean that the President would be excluded from the process of making a decision 
on these matters, the Sejm's and the Senate's right of veto would be preserved, as 
they can always veto a decision independently, under Art. 48 sec. 7 of the Treaty 
on the European Union, as I have mentioned before. It is, however, difficult to say 
whether the parliament would ever decide to exercise the right of veto, which 
could be difficult to do politically if a decision has been approved by all Member 
States (including the Polish government) at the Council or the European Council. 
Eventually, the Sejm rejected the amendments proposed by the Senate and 
did not include the government's proposal. As far as the passerelle procedures are 
concerned, the above-mentioned solutions have been applied (ratification or 
agreement), thus guaranteeing influence over the decision to all bodies: the Sejm 
and the Senate, which express their opinion in a statute, and the President who 
actually makes the decision. 
The presidential proposal of an amendment to the Polish Constitution also 
applies to the passerelle procedure. It introduces a distinction between the 
simplified revision procedures that entail the transfer of the competence of state 
authorities to the EU level and the ones that entail no such consequences. The 
former would require a consent expressed by a two third majority of votes by the 
Sejm and by an absolute majority of votes by the Senate (by analogy to the 
ratification procedure of the currently binding Art. 90 of the Constitution), in case 
of the latter, statutory solutions would apply.32 
 
Flexibility clause 
 
Another possibility to actually change the treaties without conducting a 
formal procedure is provided by the so-called flexibility clause, included in Art. 
352 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. It enables the 
European Union to undertake action not provided for in the treaties, if it is 
necessary to attain the objectives set out in the treaties. In such a situation, at the 
request of the European Commission, the Council may unanimously adopt the 
appropriate measures without the need for treaty amendments, provided that it 
obtains the consent of the European Parliament. 
Articles 7 and 11 of the new Act on Cooperation apply to the acts adopted 
on the basis of the flexibility clause. According to these provisions, before a 
proposal is considered by the Council, the government is obliged to seek the 
opinion of the relevant bodies of the Sejm and the Senate before presenting the 
position of Poland on the proposal. These opinions, similarly to the opinions 
concerning other EU legislative proposals, should constitute the basis for the Polish 
position, but they are not binding. Failure to take them into consideration results in 
the obligation to make appropriate explanations before the Sejm committee. Thus, 
unlike in case of the passerelle procedures, no special powers of the parliament 
have been provided for in relation to the flexibility clause. 
 
32 See footnote 25. 
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Withdrawal from the European Union 
 
In the Lisbon Treaty, the possibility of a Member State's withdrawal from 
the European Union has been included for the first time. In the withdrawal 
procedure, set forth in Art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union, no role for 
national parliaments has been envisaged. It does, however, state that the European 
Council shall conclude an agreement with the withdrawing state setting out the 
arrangements for its withdrawal. Such an agreement must be ratified, which 
requires the approval of the national parliament.  
Making the Polish procedure for withdrawal from the European Union 
more specific caused some legal controversies during the work on the Act on 
Cooperation (Art. 23), which regulates this issue by an amendment to the Act on 
international agreements (addition of Art. 22 a).33 This provision, however, does 
not introduce any new procedure specially for the act of withdrawal from the 
European Union, but only confirms the application in such a case of the ordinary 
procedure of terminating an international agreement which requires a statutory 
consent (Art. 89 sec. 1 of the Constitution). As one of the expert opinions on the 
draft act says: "The new provision – in its essence – in comparison with the current 
state of affairs, constitutes only an »explicit confirmation« of the existing 
interpretation that a decision to withdraw from the European Union is not an 
alternative – to the act of «terminating» – form of withdrawing by Poland from the 
obligations arising from treaties establishing the European Union".34 Both 
according to the current legal situation and in accordance with the new act, would 
require statutory consent and the act would be passed with an ordinary majority of 
votes by the Sejm and the Senate.  
Another solution was also considered, assuming the need to get the 
qualified majority of two thirds of votes for such an act to be passed. That would 
be an application of the procedure provided for in Art. 90, which had been 
accepted for the act of accession to the European Union (the actu contrario 
principle). Experts, however, decided that such a solution, without a prior change 
of the Constitution, would be incompatible with the ground–law. As it was stated 
in another opinion, "the requirement for any other majority applies only when the 
Constitution provides for it, and in case of the act giving consent to terminate an 
international agreement, referred to in Art. 90 sec. 1, such a requirement has been 
provided for in the Constitution".35 In spite of such opinions, the amendment 
introducing the application of the two thirds majority of votes was introduced by 
the Senate into the proposal,36 yet was later rejected. 
33 Act dated 14 April 2000 on international relations (Journal of Laws of 2000, No. 39, item 443; Journal 
of Laws of 2002, No. 216, item 1824). 
34 Andrzej Szmyt, Opinia prawna na temat wybranych rozwi?za? projektu ustawy o wspó?pracy Rady 
Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach zwi?zanych z cz?onkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii 
Europejskiej, op. cit.
35 Krzysztof Skotnicki, Opinia prawna na temat wybranych rozwi?za? projektu ustawy o wspó?pracy Rady 
Ministrów z Sejmem i Senatem w sprawach zwi?zanych z cz?onkostwem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii 
Europejskiej, op. cit.
36 Resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland dated 12 August 2010 r. on the act on cooperation of the 
Council of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland on matters related to the 
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In his initiative to amend the Constitution, President Bronis?aw 
Komorowski also proposed such a solution. According to this proposal, a decision 
to withdraw from the European Union would be made by the government with the 
consent granted in a statute. Such a statute would be passed with the two third 
majority of votes at the Sejm and with an absolute majority of votes at the Senate.37 
 
An important competence granted to national parliaments by the Lisbon 
Treaty is also the monitoring of the European Union's activities within the 
framework of the so-called areas of freedom, security and justice, including the 
operation of Europol and Eurojust (Art. 12 c of the Treaty on the European Union, 
Art. 85 and 89 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union). However, 
because of the lack of secondary legislation, the monitoring is currently not carried 
out. An initiative of the European Commission in this matter is expected that 
would propose the implementation of provisions in cooperation with national 
parliaments. According to information obtained at the Chancellery of the Sejm, the 
issue of implementing these provisions of the Treaty could become one of the 
subjects of the parliamentary dimension of the Polish Presidency of the Council of 
the European Union and the presidency of the Conference of Community and 
European Affairs Committees.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have had a twofold positive 
effect on the participation of the Sejm and the Senate in the EU policy-making in 
Poland. Firstly, these changes have lead to the reflection on and the evaluation of 
the system of cooperation between central institutions in EU matters. This should 
lead to improving the effectiveness of this cooperation, to filling the gaps in the 
existing law and to proper organisation of a number of issues, especially those 
connected directly with the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty. For example, provisions 
were introduced, concerning the cooperation on European matters during the 
Polish EU Presidency. However, such a comprehensive approach has been the 
reason why the adjustment process in the Polish parliament has taken such a long 
time. 
Secondly, the Treaty has had a positive effect on the role of the Sejm and the 
Senate in EU policy-making not only through its provisions, but also indirectly – 
through domestic regulations which have been subsequently adopted. In the 
course of the adjustment process, national parliaments have managed to gain 
greater powers. For example, this was how the Sejm and the Senate gained decisive 
influence on the Polish position within the passerelle procedure. 
The adjustment process is still underway, but the completion of work on the 
new Act on Cooperation concluded its most important and most time-consuming 
phase. The effectiveness of the parliament's activity in European matters will 
                      
membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union (Sejm print no. 3339). 
37 See footnote 25. 
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largely depend on changes in the Rules of Procedure and – to an even greater 
extent – on the willingness of members of parliament to make use of the tools they 
have received. 
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